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Privacy and Security details
The Atlassian Marketplace partner is responsible for the accuracy of the information provided below. Details with a verified status are confirmed by Atlassian. For any further queries, contact the partner.
Data storage and management
End-User Data processed and/or stored outside of Atlassian apps and services (excluding process/storage of End-User Data in logs)
The app processes and stores the following types of End-User Data:
USER ACCOUNT DATA (per app user) • Email address (sign-in identifier) • Hashed password (bcrypt; only for email/password sign-in) • Atlassian accountId of the OAuth-authenticating user • Atlassian display name + email + avatar URL (captured at OAuth connect time from https://api.atlassian.com/me) • Login-fingerprint metadata: last_login_ip, last_login_at, failed_login_attempts, locked_until (used for new-device alerts and per-account lockout)
OAUTH AND WEBHOOK CREDENTIALS (encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM envelope encryption — see PETs answer) • Jira OAuth 2.0 (3LO) access tokens • Jira OAuth 2.0 (3LO) refresh tokens • Google OAuth refresh tokens (only for users who sign in via Google; never used to read Google data) • Webhook signing secrets registered with each Jira site
JIRA ISSUE DATA (mirrored from the user's connected Jira projects into our PostgreSQL database) • Issue key (e.g. PROJ-123) and Jira-canonical URL • Summary, description (ADF + plain-text), status, issue type, priority, labels • Assignee email, reporter email • External created / updated timestamps • Full raw Jira JSON payload — JSONB column, automatically NULLed after 30 days (daily cleanup task)
JIRA COMMENT DATA • Source and target comment IDs • Comment body (Atlassian Document Format) • Author accountId / displayName • Comment created/updated timestamps
JIRA ATTACHMENT METADATA • Source and target attachment IDs, filename, MIME type, byte size • Content URL (signed Jira URL — bytes themselves are NOT stored by us; we re-upload directly between Jira instances)
SYNC CONFIGURATION (created by the user) • Source and target project keys • Direction (source_to_target or bidirectional) • Field mappings: issue type, priority, status, user (Jira accountId → Jira accountId) • Per-rule attribution style preference
PAIRING / SYNC STATE • issue_sync_links: source ↔ target external_id pairs + per-field baselines for conflict detection • comment_sync_links: source ↔ target comment ID pairs • attachment_sync_links: source ↔ target attachment pairs
BILLING DATA (we do NOT store payment card data; Stripe holds it) • Stripe customer ID (opaque identifier) • Plan tier and subscription state
OPERATIONAL / AUDIT • Sync attempt log: timestamp, direction, status, error message • Incoming webhook event IDs (for deduplication only — no payload retained)
Data residency for in-scope End-User Data
No.
App does not support data residency options.
List of in-scope End-User Data
No.
App does not support data residency options.
List of out-of-scope End-User Data
No.
App does not support data residency options.
Migration of in-scope End-User Data between data residency supported locations
No.
App does not support data residency options.
End-User Data shared with third-party entities
Amazon Web Services (AWS) — Simple Email Service (SES)
Link:
https://aws.amazon.com/compliance/gdpr-center/
Location:
🇮🇪
Ireland
Purpose:
transactional email (account verification, password reset, new-device-sign-in alerts, billing notifications). Data shared: end-user email address + message content (which may reference the user's workspace name or account state).
Stripe, Inc. — Subscription billing
Link:
https://stripe.com/legal/dpa
Location:
🇫🇷
France
🇨🇦
Canada
🇦🇺
Australia
🇺🇲
United States of America
🇩🇪
Germany
🇯🇵
Japan
🇷🇴
Romania
Purpose:
handling subscription payments and storing payment- method data (we never see or store card data ourselves; it is collected directly by Stripe's hosted Checkout).
Atlassian (Jira Cloud) — Source/target of all sync activity
Link:
https://atlassian.com
Location:
🇦🇺
Australia
🇫🇷
France
🇨🇦
Canada
🇩🇪
Germany
🇺🇲
United States of America
🇯🇵
Japan
🇷🇴
Romania
Purpose:
by design, the product reads and writes Jira issues, comments, and attachments on the end-user's own connected Jira sites. Listed here for completeness even though Atlassian is the origin of the data rather than a downstream processor
End-User Data accessed in logs
Yes
End-User Data processed and/or stored in logs outside of Atlassian apps and services
Yes
End-User Data in logs shared with third-party entities
No
End-User Data in logs shared with third party entities integral for app functionality
No
End-User Data stored after app is uninstalled
Minimum storage period post un-install:
1 day
Maximum storage period post un-install:
7 days
Custom retention period for End-User Data
Yes
Supports customer-managed egress
No.
The app only accesses domains declared during installation.
Security and compliance
Contact for app security issues
App’s e-mail contact:
support@devopsteam.ioIntegration permissions with Atlassian apps
None.
Compliance certifications
None.
Marketplace Security Bug Bounty Program participant
No
CAIQ Lite
CAIQ Lite Questionnaire has not been submitted
Security policy
Response not provided by the partner
Full disk encryption for data stored outside of Atlassian
Yes
App accesses Atlassian Personal Access Tokens (PATs), user account passwords, or another type of shared secret
No
Privacy
Privacy policy
Atlassian's privacy policy is not applicable to the use of this app. Please refer to the privacy policy provided by this app's partner.
Partner privacy policyCompany/Organization is a 'data controller' under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) with reference to this app
Yes.
Company/Organization is a 'data controller' for the following types of End-User Data:
• User account identifiers: - Email address (sign-in identifier) - Hashed password (bcrypt; email/password sign-in only) - Atlassian accountId (when the user signs in via Atlassian OAuth) and Google sub (when the user signs in via Google)
• User profile data captured from Atlassian's /me endpoint at OAuth connect time: - Atlassian display name - Atlassian email - Atlassian avatar URL
• Login-fingerprint and security metadata: - last_login_ip, last_login_at - failed_login_attempts, locked_until (per-account lockout)
• Account creation metadata: - Tenant (workspace) name and slug - Created-at timestamp
• Billing metadata (the payment-method data itself is held by Stripe, not by us): - Stripe customer ID - Plan tier and subscription state
• User-created sync configuration: - Sync rule definitions: source/target project keys, direction, field mappings (issue types, priorities, statuses, user maps), attribution style preference
• Operational records: - Sync attempt log (timestamps, status, error messages) - Audit trail of admin actions
Company/Organization is a 'data processor' under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) with reference to this app
Yes.
Company/Organization is a 'data processor' for the following types of End-User Data:
• Jira issue data mirrored from the customer's Jira sites: - Issue key and canonical URL - Summary, description (ADF + plain text) - Status, issue type, priority, labels - Assignee email, reporter email - External created / updated timestamps - Full raw Jira JSON payload — automatically NULLed after 30 days (daily cleanup task)
• Jira comment data: - Comment ID, body (Atlassian Document Format), author accountId/displayName, created/updated timestamps
• Jira attachment metadata (we do NOT store the bytes themselves; we re-upload directly between Jira instances): - Source and target attachment IDs, filename, MIME type, size
• Sync pairing state derived from the customer's data: - issue_sync_links: source ↔ target external_id pairs + per-field baselines for conflict detection - comment_sync_links, attachment_sync_links
• Encrypted OAuth tokens used to access the customer's Jira sites on their behalf (AES-256-GCM envelope encryption; see PETs answer)
Company/Organization is a 'business' under the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA) with reference to this app
Not applicable.
Company/Organization is not subject to the CCPA.
Company/Organization is a 'service provider' under the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA) with reference to this app
Not applicable.
Company/Organization is not subject to the CCPA.
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) approved mechanism for transferring European Economic Area (EEA) residents’s End-User Data outside of the EEA
Yes,
EU Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) — European Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2021/914, Modules 2 (controller-to- processor) and 3 (processor-to-processor) as applicable, as incorporated into our sub-processor Stripe's Data Processing Agreement (https://stripe.com/legal/dpa).
Privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) used to protect End-User Data
Yes
AES-256-GCM envelope encryption for OAuth refresh tokens and webhook signing secrets at rest. A per-row Data Encrypting Key (DEK) protects each credential; the DEK itself is encrypted with a per-environment master Key Encrypting Key (KEK) managed outside the database. A stolen database backup is unreadable without the KEK
Two-key rotation window for the KEK. During a rotation, decrypts accept either the current or previous KEK while a worker re-encrypts every credential under the new key, minimizing the exposure window of any single compromised key.
PostgreSQL Row-Level Security (RLS) enforced at the database engine. The application's runtime DB role has NOBYPASSRLS, so even an application bug cannot read another tenant's rows. Every tenant-owned table has a tenant_isolation policy keyed on a session-set GUC (app.current_tenant_id).
• TLS 1.2+ in transit, with HSTS preload (max-age 31536000, includeSubDomains, preload) so browsers refuse downgrade attempts.
Pseudonymization via Atlassian accountId. Where the product references Jira users in sync mappings and logs, we use the opaque accountId rather than email/display-name where feasible.
Log and error-reporting scrubbing. Webhook URLs include a path secret for authentication; a logging filter rewrites /webhooks/jira/<id>/<secret> to /webhooks/jira/<id>/<REDACTED> before access logs reach stdout or the error-tracking pipeline, preventing secret leakage through pod logs and Sentry events.
HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Lax session cookies — the session JWT is unreadable from JavaScript, so a successful XSS cannot exfiltrate it.
• Per-account lockout (10 consecutive failed logins → 15-minute account-level lock regardless of source IP), reducing the feasibility of distributed credential-stuffing attacks against any individual account.
Data Processing Agreement (DPA) for customers
Yes,
DPA
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